Entitlement to Reasons for Action by Roth, Abraham
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 15/03/17, SPi
Intentional action traditionally is understood in terms of reasons  explanation.1 
Crudely put, when I φ intentionally, I φ for a reason, where the reason 
explains the point of φ-ing. I contend that on occasion one’s entitlement to 
certain reasons had by someone else allows for those reasons to figure in the 
intentional description of what one does. The entitlement secures for those 
reasons an explanatory role they otherwise would lack. Normally, the rea-
sons for which I act are my reasons; I represent goal states and the means to 
attaining them, and these reasons guide me in action. If I haven’t yet taken 
up your reason and made it mine by representing it for myself, then it may 
seem mysterious how it explains what I do. Nevertheless, I argue that some-
times what one does should be explained this way, and I take some steps 
toward showing how this is possible.
I’m concerned here with explanatory reasons, and this makes defending 
the proposal more challenging. Merely justificatory reasons might be given 
to put an agent’s φ-ing in a good light, but they don’t purport to explain 
why the agent did what she did or describe what she was up to in doing it. 
You may have all sorts of reasons for thinking that my φ-ing is a good thing. 
No one would find it problematic for you to cite them as some justification 
or defense for what I’ve done, even if I were not aware of them. But if I don’t 
have those reasons in mind, then it is controversial to cite them to explain 
my φ-ing, to make sense of what I was up to when I φ-d.2
1 Davidson (1980), Anscombe (1963).
2 The relevant notion of explanation is the sort of rationalizing explanation that phi-
losophers such as Davidson and Anscombe have tied to intentional action. This underlies 
the novelty and significance of the central thesis of the chapter. There are, of course, other 
kinds of explanation of action that might be offered up by cognitive or social psychology, 
and it might not be news that the agent needn’t represent for herself explanations of her 
actions so understood. It’s a good question just how those explanations are related to the 
reasons explanations that are my concern here. I won’t try to answer that interesting 
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It is not surprising, then, that in discussions of the explanation of action, 
we do not seem to encounter the sort of possibility to be defended here. 
Davidson, for example, insists that what explains the action is the agent’s 
primary reason, which shows “what the agent sees in the action”. He under-
stands the primary reason to consist of the agent’s desire (or some other 
pro-attitude) regarding actions with a certain property, along with a belief that 
the action has this property (Davidson 1963: 687). But I am suggesting that the 
reason that can sometimes be invoked in explanation is not  something that 
the agent sees in the action, and it is not a reason that the agent possesses in 
Davidson’s sense. Rather, it is a reason had by someone else.
Anscombe likewise doesn’t seem to consider the possibility.3 She describes 
a case where a host tells a guest to hang a hat on a hook. She finds that it is 
often unclear in these sorts of cases whether what we have is a mere auto-
matic response to be explained by causation, or a full-blown intentional 
action she thinks is to be explained by reasons and not causes. But she says 
that if one were forced to decide, “the more the action is described as a mere 
response, the more inclined one would be to use the word ‘cause’; while the 
more it is described as a response to something as having a significance that 
is dwelt on by the agent, or as a response surrounded with thoughts and ques-
tions, the more inclined one would be to use the word ‘reason’.”4 My con-
cern here is not whether reasons explanation is or is not causal explanation. 
What is of interest is that Anscombe uses language here that is suggestive of 
the agent having in mind the reason for the action. Thus, for Anscombe too, 
it seems the agent must in some sense possess the reason in order for it to 
explain the action.
My proposal, in contrast, is that sometimes one may act for reasons that 
one doesn’t possess. Entitlement to another’s reason allows that reason to figure 
in the explanation of some of the things that one does. The natural home 
for this idea of entitlement would be in a theory of shared agency. That’s not 
to say that the idea of entitlement has no precedents in our understanding 
of individual agency. Indeed, the strategy for clarifying the proposal and 
making the case for it will be to bring to the fore aspects of the interplay 
between reasons and intentions in the individual case that have not received 
the attention they deserve. This is what I go on to do in the next section. 
question on this occasion. I take it that what I’m saying here might nevertheless be of 
interest for anyone except perhaps the crudest advocate of a simple-minded  eliminativism 
about reasons explanation.
3 She does consider the possibility of the agent being given a reason and accepting it 
(Anscombe 1957: 330–1).
4 Anscombe (1957: 331, emphasis added). As she makes clear shortly thereafter, the 
thoughts in question are ones that contribute to answering the appropriate why- question—
the one that seeks reasons for the action.
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I then consider the interpersonal case in section 2. The scope of entitlement 
is not unlimited, and in the final section I explore a couple of ways in which 
we might understand how it is constrained.
4.1 ACTING ON A PRIOR INTENTION
As a preliminary, consider what might be called guidance cases, where one 
attends to the progress one is making toward some goal and guides what 
one is doing in light of this attention.5 For example, I am in a seminar and 
want to ask a question. I raise my hand in such a way as to get the speaker’s 
attention. How high I raise my arm, my timing in executing it, and whether 
it is supplemented perhaps acoustically or by a wave of the hand or a shift 
in posture, will all depend on the progress I’m making toward getting her 
attention. If someone were to ask why I am raising my hand, I might invoke 
the ‘in order to’ locution and say something like this:
(1) I’m raising my hand in order to get the speaker’s attention (in order that 
she may call on me).
Here, we are supposing that a consideration that explains why one is  acting—
the reason for which one is doing whatever it is that one is doing—is explicitly 
and actively represented in the agent’s action plan. The reason amounts to 
the goal or aim of action, and the agent (or causal mechanism within the 
agent) guides movements or sub-actions to bring about the explicitly and 
actively represented aim. The attentive guidance model of reasons explanation 
holds that any reasons explanation of action must conform to this picture of 
guidance.
But this guidance model goes too far. Sometimes a consideration that 
might serve as an explanatory reason doesn’t seem to be explicitly and 
actively represented. In this sense, the agent doesn’t have in mind the fur-
ther reason when performing the action. Different sorts of cases are relevant 
here,6 but let me illustrate with acting on a prior intention, which will 
occupy most of my discussion. Suppose that I’m scheduled to get a new 
fridge installed and, to make way for it, I must move the sofa to the edge of 
the living room. So, I decide I will do this later when I get a chance. When 
the time comes and I’m moving the sofa, do I necessarily have in mind that 
5 Frankfurt (1978), Wilson (1989). This is not to say that these authors advocate the 
guidance model discussed below. For some discussion of why guidance is not just a 
 matter of pure feedback, see Jeannerod (2006).
6 Action with ends that are quite removed; policies; habitual action (where one attends 
neither to the performance itself nor to some more removed end).
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I’m doing this in order to make way for the fridge? Yes, most likely. But do I 
have to? If I can do the job well enough without consciously attending to my 
progress toward the goal of making way for the fridge, then I don’t see why this 
is necessary. It is cognitively burdensome to have to keep track of all the reasons 
I may have for whatever it is that I’m doing (Bratman 1987, Harman 1986). 
Often I just want to focus on the act; but sometimes I like to think about or 
daydream about other things while performing the act. Either way, the further 
goals of the act need not occupy my attention. So let us imagine that I’m not 
thinking about making way for the fridge as I push the sofa to the edge of the 
room. Nevertheless, if someone were to ask why I was doing this, it seems that 
the appropriate reasons explanation would be something like:
(2) I am moving the sofa in order to make way for the fridge.
It would be appropriate to describe what I’m doing as making way for the 
fridge. And I maintain this even though I don’t explicitly and actively rep-
resent this reason at the time of action.
For another case, let’s turn to an example from what we might call 
 middle-aged philosophy of action, and consider a case of forgetting what 
one is doing. Suppose that I walk down the hall from my office to the main 
department office to retrieve a printout. By the time I reach the main office, 
I have a senior moment and do not remember what I’ve come for. I end up 
peering into my empty mailbox and having a conversation with a colleague 
instead. Nevertheless, the explanation for my walking down the hall would 
be something like:
(3) I am walking down the hall in order to retrieve the printout
even though if someone were to ask me I might already have forgotten and 
be unable to give this answer. This case reinforces the lesson drawn from 
acting on prior intentions more generally, as in the sofa example. Namely, 
the scope of reasons explanation extends beyond what is entailed by the 
attentive guidance model.7
Resisting the intrapersonal (diachronic) entitlement claim: Are we being 
too quick to dismiss the attentive guidance model? Can we, for example, 
re-interpret the sofa case so that it conforms to that model? That is, assum-
ing that when moving the sofa I’m not explicitly and actively representing 
the goal of getting the fridge through, might we point to something else 
that is explicitly represented and serves to guide my performance? It might 
7 Many instances of negative action or omission also serve as counterexamples to the 
attentive guidance model. My not going to a party can be intentional; my reason is that 
I don’t want to see X there. However, I don’t have to attend to or guide what I do to avoid 
going to the party. I just stay at home as I normally do.
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be that when I move the sofa, I’m also thinking about creating more flow 
or a more pleasing living space. But we can just stipulate that in this case 
I don’t have such other reasons for moving the sofa. Still, we might try to 
re-interpret the case by appealing to the fact that, although I don’t have in 
mind that I’m making way for the fridge, I am acting on the prior intention 
to move the sofa. Acting on a prior intention is an inescapable element of 
the sort of case I’m describing, and so I can’t just stipulate it away. So 
 perhaps we have the following reasons explanation:
(4) I’m moving the sofa in order to act on my prior intention (to move the 
sofa).
There may be cases like this. Perhaps I tend to be lazy or weak-willed, and 
am making an effort to take my resolutions and decisions more seriously. In 
this context, given that I have decided and now intend to move the sofa, 
I should stick with it. (Perhaps my therapist tells me that I should practice 
following through on my intentions . . .) That might be a way of making 
sense of what I’m doing here. But the peculiarity of such a rationalization 
suggests that this strategy of re-interpreting the case won’t generalize.
Part of what makes the proposed re-interpretation problematic as a more 
general approach is that it distorts the subject matter or justificatory struc-
ture of the reasons. In the case at hand, I’m moving the sofa in order to 
make way for the fridge. That’s the reason. The justificatory structure faces 
outward toward the worldly concerns of home improvement; it’s not 
( normally) a matter of self-improvement—that is, it’s not about my reso-
luteness or remedying the lack thereof.
In this regard, we should keep in mind what it is that we are normally 
interested in when we ask why someone is φ-ing: we’re asking what the 
point of φ-ing is. So we would be frustrated if the answer were something 
like, he φ-d in order to fulfill his earlier decision or prior intention to φ. We 
would immediately ask why he had so decided. At this point the advocate 
of the attentive guidance model might acknowledge that the consideration 
about making way for the fridge figured in my prior decision to move the 
sofa, but insist that by the time I actually move the sofa, if I am no longer 
thinking of the fridge, then the only explanatory reason on the scene is that 
concerning fulfillment of the prior intention (to move the sofa). But I think 
it would be odd for the reasons for intending/decision to come apart so 
 easily from the reasons for the corresponding action.8
So, my response to the re-interpretation of the example is that it’s com-
mitted to a mistaken inward- or self-directedness of the reasons for the 
8 That’s not to deny that they sometimes do come apart, as the toxin case illustrates 
(Kavka 1983).
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action.9 But if that’s the charge, can the problem be ameliorated with the 
suggestion that fulfilling a prior intention to φ counts as a reason for φ-ing 
on the grounds that fulfilling prior intentions generally promotes better 
outcomes? Thus the explanation might be something like:
(5) I’m moving the sofa in order to act on my prior intention to move it (and 
I’m acting on my prior intention because doing so tends reliably towards 
better outcomes).
That may be a reason for acting, but again it strikes me as a rather odd one. 
In the normal course of things, the general reliability of the policy of acting 
on prior intentions (even if true) does not figure in the rationalization of a 
particular action. It is, rather, taken for granted as a presupposition for 
 reasons explanation of action, and not normally what one is looking for 
when asking why the agent is doing something. This explanation might be 
given by self-conscious action theorists. I might use it as a justification if I’m 
being particularly reflective and wondering whether I’ve been pursuing my 
ends in an effective or efficient manner. I suspect, however, that this is not 
what most agents are concerned with, and it isn’t what I’m up to when for 
example I move the sofa.
I conclude that the natural context in which reasons explanations are 
requested and given shows that it is implausible to appeal to something like 
implementing an intention as a reason for the action. That suggests that we 
should interpret the cases we discussed as we did initially: as ones for which 
the attentive guidance model does not apply. Not all explanatory reasons 
are explicitly and actively represented by the agent in the performance of 
the action.
Neither of the proposed re-interpretations of the sofa case is plausible. 
Still, we might wonder what positive consideration might be given for 
thinking that considerations that don’t figure in attentive guidance may 
nevertheless serve as explanatory reasons. Here’s one thought. Though 
I don’t have in mind at the time of action that the reason for moving the 
sofa is to make way for the fridge, that reason nevertheless serves as a stand-
ard for whether I am successful in performing the action. And it’s not just 
any standard. There are, of course, many standards against which the action 
might be judged. It might be executed gracefully enough to meet the stand-
ards for providing aesthetic pleasure for those witnessing my efforts. Or, it 
might meet the standard of reassuring housemates that I am willing to 
do my share of what needs to be done around the house. But these weren’t 
9 A further worry becomes evident if we recall that the proposed re-interpretation is 
tied to defending the attentive guidance model. The proposal holds, implausibly, that the 
agent necessarily is attending to the prior decision or intention.
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(at least in this case) the standards relevant for defining what I was up to, 
and so standards that explain what I’m doing. The relevant standards define 
whether I succeed at what I’m doing and are those that at least in principle 
play a regulative role for the agent. Although I may not have standards in 
mind when I perform the sofa moving, I may afterwards assess whether I for 
example moved the sofa far enough so as to allow the fridge to get through. 
If not, I may have to have another go at it.10
So, again, the normal structure of the reason explanation when I’m acting 
on the prior intention was:
(2) I’m moving the sofa in order to make way for the fridge.
Though the consideration of making way for the fridge is not in this instance 
implicated in the active guidance of my sofa-moving, I am entitled to it as 
part of the intentional description of what I’m doing in moving the sofa, 
and as a reason for why I’m moving it. Entitlement relates one to reasons in 
a way to be distinguished from the active guidance that we have in the 
attentive guidance model; it does not require explicit representation at the 
time of action.
The line of thought here starts with a claim about the structure or subject 
matter of explanatory reasons in the case where the agent is acting on a prior 
intention. (We might put this point by saying that the intentionality of the 
action is richer than that of merely acting on some prior intention.) If a 
reason explains an action, then the agent performs that action for that rea-
son. If the agent acts for that reason, then either the reason figures in the 
attentive guidance of the action (i.e. the reason is explicitly and actively 
represented), or else the agent is related to the reason in some other way. 
Call this other way of relating to reasons entitlement. Sometimes an agent 
acts for a reason, but does not do so via attentive guidance. So, sometimes 
an agent has an entitlement to a reason that explains his or her action.
The argument is meant to show that there must be some such entitlement. 
I am not offering a theory or account of what this entitlement consists in or 
how it’s possible to have this entitlement. Still, some brief remarks are in 
order. Given that one is acting on a prior decision or intention that did 
involve the explicit or active representation of the reason, the picture of 
entitlement will be broadly historical and causal. It seems relevant for the sorts 
of cases that we’re discussing that at some point in the past the explanatory 
consideration was explicitly represented in deliberation or decision-making. 
10 Of course, the self-imposed standards won’t be able to play their role in regulating 
what the agent does if they have been forgotten. But that doesn’t mean that they no 
longer apply as standards; nor does it imply that they don’t figure in the explanation of 
what the agent did manage to perform.
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These historical conditions might then be supplemented or elaborated in 
terms of a cognitive architecture or infrastructure that allows for something 
that is not explicitly and actively represented (but at one point was so 
 represented) to figure in the intentional description and explanation of the 
action. For example, I may have a reason R that is a consideration for 
 performing some action φ. In response to R, I start to draw up plans 
for φ-ing, and fill them in as I proceed. But at some point, R need no longer 
be represented. It’s done its job in deliberation, being weighed against other 
considerations, and leading to the decision and intention to φ. Nevertheless, 
it remains that R is the reason why I’m φ-ing. Intentional action is in gen-
eral action that we can make (at least some minimal) sense of. And giving a 
reason for an action is a fundamental way of doing this, even in some cases 
where the reason doesn’t figure in the active guidance of the performance.
4.2 THE INTERPERSONAL CASE
I think that entitlement to a reason also figures in interpersonal cases, such 
as that of joint action. As in the individual case, I will suggest that the struc-
ture and subject matter of reasons for certain contributions to joint or 
shared activity supports the claim of entitlement.
Consider the following: You and I are going to a conference downtown 
by car. I drive; you navigate. You say turn left, and I do. Why did I turn left? 
We can say:
(6) I am turning left in order (eventually) to get downtown,
where the in order to locution again marks the reason for the action. But it 
seems to me that there is more to the structure of reasons here, that the 
meaning or intentionality of the action is richer than is suggested by (6). In 
particular, there may be a route-based consideration for turning left. For 
example:
(7) I am turning left in order to get on Dunedin in order to take High Street 
to get downtown.11
11 Some would grant no more than that we are turning left in order get on Dunedin in 
order to take High Street downtown. But, since I’m driving, we are turning left in virtue of 
my turning left; arguably my turning left is our turning left. So even if we reject (7), we 
are left with a challenge very similar to what will concern me in this paper: that of under-
standing the intimate and seemingly explanatory and intelligibility-conferring connec-
tion between the reason involving the route-based considerations on the one hand and 
my intentional contribution to our turning left on the other.
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The route-based considerations underlying your directive figure in the 
intentional description of my turning, even though I do not myself have a 
clear sense of the route: I may be unaware of that particular reason for which 
I turn. Thus, I can ask you: now, why am I turning left here?, and you can fill 
me in. Your reason sets the standard for whether I succeed at what I’m 
doing. And my access to the reason via communication with you is presum-
ably what enables the reason to play the regulative role that we typically 
expect of the reasons why an agent acts.
Thus, if you mean to instruct me to go left, but don’t speak clearly (or 
even misspeak) and I hear you as saying go west, and so turn right (which is 
west), that’s a problem: High Street is not in that direction, and we’ll have 
to double back or else take a different route downtown. I may be blameless, 
but the standard that governs and regulates what I do is given by the route-
based consideration. What I was up to was getting to High Street, and I’m 
failing at that by turning right.12
These route-based considerations figure in the intentional description of 
the action, even though I don’t have in mind the specific route we’re taking. 
The upshot, then, is that I am entitled to your reasons—the route-based con-
siderations in this case—for turning left. (Just as I’m acting for the reason 
that went into the deliberation that led to a prior intention.)
What would account for one person being entitled to the reasons of 
another? There is, presumably, a causal and historical story to be told here, 
as in the case of entitlement in the individual case. Moreover, it is likely that 
the account would advert to a cognitive infrastructure—but this time partly 
social. A comprehensive theory of shared agency should have something to 
say about this. I will not undertake that here, and will not be offering an 
account of this entitlement. The more modest goal of the paper is just to 
point to the existence of this entitlement or, at the very least, to suggest that 
our conception of what someone is doing in certain social contexts such as 
that of joint action would seem to commit us to it.
Resisting the interpersonal entitlement claim: Some may want to push 
back against this picture of the interpersonal case. Might we re-interpret the 
case so that reasons of my own make it unnecessary to invoke any entitle-
ment to another’s reasons to explain the action? For example, why isn’t the 
reason for what I did simply that you told me to? That is:
(8) I’m turning left in order to comply with your instructions.
12 Compare the case of miscommunication with that of misremembering. For exam-
ple, I go down the hall in order to fetch the printout, but on my way I misremember and 
think I’m off to check my mailbox.
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I have no doubt that sometimes we do have such reasons. Perhaps I have 
had difficulty following instructions generally and want to work on it. Or 
(imagining that the navigator in this example is a woman) perhaps I have 
recently come to the realization that I don’t take seriously instructions given 
to me by women, and so am making a conscious effort to follow your 
instructions. Or, relying on my navigational gut instincts has led me astray 
on many occasions and so I am now making a conscious effort to resist my 
intuitions and to follow someone else’s lead instead. In these sorts of cases, 
it’s reasonable to say that I’m turning left in order to comply with the 
instructions. But to take this as the general model threatens to distort what’s 
going on in shared activity. Normally, following instructions is not a matter 
of concern and attention. The proposed re-interpretation of the case is 
problematic in bringing to the foreground something that is normally in 
the background.13 This is not to deny that one is acting on the instructions, 
just as one acts on a prior intention. But acting on a prior intention to φ 
isn’t normally a reason for φ-ing; nor in the case of shared activity is comply-
ing with instructions to φ normally a reason for φ-ing.14
Let’s consider another attempt at re-interpreting our case:
(9) I’m turning left in order to take advantage of your reliability as a naviga-
tor so that I can get (us) downtown.
The first thing to say here is that assuming that this is indeed a reason for 
me to turn left, it is quite compatible with my having other reasons as well. 
So if my reason for turning left is to comply with your instructions (because 
I think that following your instructions will get me downtown), that doesn’t 
mean that I’m not also acting for the route-based considerations. It is easy 
for us to forget this because discussion of acting for a reason is often in the 
context of how it is that one is acting for one reason and not for another.15 
One tends to forget that sometimes one might be acting for both reasons.
But to leave it at that is a bit misleading, because it suggests that the 
considerations in question are independent of one another. Recall that in 
our example I was suggesting that the route-based considerations that you 
13 Admittedly, if the navigator were to ask me why I turned left, it might be natural 
for me to reply, “because you told me to.” But the navigator presumably would only ask 
this if somehow there was miscommunication or confusion; perhaps she misspoke, or 
I misheard. I don’t think that the naturalness of locutions such as (8) for what amounts 
to the case of a breakdown in execution should dictate what counts as the reasons for the 
action in the case where things proceed smoothly. I want to thank a referee for prompting 
these remarks.
14 Thinking of intentions as reasons also raises worries about illegitimate bootstrap-
ping. See Bratman (1987), and Broome (2001).
15 See Davidson’s central argument against Anscombe’s account of reasons explanation 
in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” in Davidson 1980.
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have is a reason for me to turn left. The alternative suggestion for turning 
left is simply to make use of your reliability in this matter. But I contend 
that in the normal case, your reliability is not a reason for turning left. It is, 
rather, a consideration that rebuts a possible defeater for my entitlement to 
your reasons. If some question or doubt is raised about your navigational 
instructions, then it might be appropriate to respond by pointing out that 
you are reliable in giving driving directions. Thus, I might retain confidence 
that the reason for my turning left—whatever it is—is sound.
So it is problematic to assume that your reliability is a reason for my 
 turning left because it distorts the normal structure of reasons in this case. 
It fails to show how the thought that your instructions are a good guide to 
going downtown can be blocking a potential defeater for my entitlement to 
your reasons. I’m not saying that your reliability cannot ever serve as a  reason; 
it’s just that in shared agency it usually is not a reason for what I’m doing. 
Reliability works by supporting the entitlement to the navigator’s reasons.16
If one were to insist that the reason for my turning left is simply to com-
ply with instructions as in (8), then we won’t account for the naturalness 
of  looking through the instructions to what their point is. I’m sensitive to 
indications of progress toward getting downtown to where the conference 
is. If I think we’re heading in a different direction I might ask: do you realize 
that this is taking us north, but wasn’t downtown south? Whereas if I’m just 
following orders, I don’t need to start asking any questions, given that your 
instruction was simple: turn left here.
I’m not suggesting that in “looking through” the instructions I’m explicitly 
representing the further considerations for turning left. The whole point is 
that this needn’t be so. But the naturalness of looking through the instructions 
in this sense suggests that I take the point of the instructions—the reasons 
underlying them—to have a significance for what I’m doing, for what I’m 
up to. They set a standard for what I take myself to be doing, and through 
you they can play a regulative role for how I carry out my contribution to 
what we’re doing. I am in this way taking you as a source and repository of 
reasons for what I’m doing.
In contrast, on the proposed re-interpretation (9), I take you the naviga-
tor as, in effect, a reliable black box. Your reasons have no direct bearing on 
what I’m doing. I am not concerned to look through your commands to 
what their point is, and have no immediate interest that might be taken in 
the reasons underlying the directions you issue. Rather than a source of 
reasons for me, you (or your reliability on the matter) constitute my reason. 
16 Burge (2013) makes something like this point in developing his 1993 account of 
testimony.
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In this way, you (or your agency) have a status that is more like that of a 
reliable instrument available to me as a resource rather than a rational agent 
with whom I’m acting.
This is not to say that regarding the navigator in this way is necessarily 
wrong or problematic in general. It may be a perfectly appropriate attitude 
to be taken by a passenger in the back seat being driven by the main char-
acters in our scenario. But that’s because the fellow in the back is not a 
participant in the joint action and has no entitlement, for example, to the 
route-based considerations underlying the direction to turn left.17
4.3 THE LIMITS OF ENTITLEMENT
I’ve argued that sometimes when individuals act together, one participant 
may be entitled to reasons had by another. But not all reasons are available 
to another in this way. Some lie beyond the scope of entitlement.
The Instrumental Hypothesis. To return to the drive downtown, imagine 
that you the navigator have more than one reason for instructing me the 
driver to turn left. One is the route-based consideration. But suppose also 
that part of why you selected this High Street route was that it’ll take us 
right by a café where your ex is set up outside with his laptop. You relish the 
opportunity to be seen with me (who wouldn’t want to be seen with me?), 
thereby further tormenting his already tortured soul. I would never know-
ingly act for such a purpose (it’s not nice, plus the guy is big, with a mean 
temper), but let us suppose that this sort of motive on your part is compat-
ible with our acting together. (I’m imagining that you didn’t orchestrate the 
whole ride downtown under false pretense so as to torment your ex.) So we 
might ask whether I am in this situation entitled to this reason of yours. 
Can such a consideration figure as part of the explanation for what I’m 
doing? That is, can we say:
(10) I’m turning left in order to drive by your ex so that we’re seen by him (so 
that he’s further tormented).
I think it’s pretty clear that this consideration should not count as part of the 
reasons explanation of what I’m doing.
Part of why I am entitled to the route-based considerations as a reason for 
why I’m turning left is that those considerations serve an end that you and 
I share—namely, that of getting downtown. This suggests the instrumental 
17 Can there be cases where I have an entitlement to your reasons, but I also have very 
good empirical evidence for your reliability? Having this evidence of reliability shouldn’t 
preclude my also having an entitlement to your reasons.
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hypothesis that if I am to be entitled to one of your reasons, you must regard 
that consideration as instrumental for or contributory to the φ-ing that you 
and I are doing together.18 Tormenting the ex in no way promotes an end 
we share and therefore is not a reason to which I am entitled.
If we were to adopt this simple instrumental hypothesis, it would seem 
that our ultimate shared end—in this case getting downtown—would 
define an outer boundary for entitlement. What would this say about 
 further and divergent ends each of us may have for going downtown? 
Suppose the driver is trying to get downtown to go to the museum, and the 
navigator is also trying to get downtown, though not to go to the museum 
but rather to see a game. Would the following be a legitimate, if partial, 
reasons explanation?
(11) I’m turning left in order to get you to the game.
Of course, if I am aware that you are going downtown in order to get to the 
game, then I can easily take on as one of my ends the goal of getting you 
there. Then it would be uncontroversial that I turn left at least in part to 
further that end. But the issue is one of entitlement, and we are to imagine 
the possibility that I don’t know why you want to go downtown. It is not 
so clear to me that there is entitlement to such a consideration in this case. 
If there is no such entitlement, then that would be some confirmation of 
the instrumental hypothesis regarding entitlement, since getting you to the 
game is not instrumental to our going downtown.
There does seem to be a difference between the instrumental route-based 
considerations to which I am entitled and your further end for which it’s 
not clear that I have entitlement. However, we should not be too hasty in 
dismissing entitlement in this instance. A consideration in favor of entitle-
ment stems from the thought that your further end (of getting to the game) 
might figure as part of the standard of success for what I’m doing, and part 
of what regulates how I proceed. Thus, it might constrain how I pursue the 
end of going downtown; how I proceed might be regulated in such a way as 
to go to a part of downtown that is more convenient to your end of going 
to the game. This might suggest that I do have an entitlement to this further 
end of yours, even though it is not instrumental to our explicitly shared end 
of getting downtown.
18 Another hypothesis would be that if X is entitled to Y’s reason R as a reason for φ-ing, 
then Y must regard R as consistent with X’s aims, intentions, values, etc. (This is quite 
different from the material about defeaters below, since it’s only formulated in terms of 
what Y thinks.) In any case, I don’t find this hypothesis to be plausible. It lets in way too 
much and ignores X’s practical orientation.
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If this is correct—and I’m not sure that it is—then the simple  instrumental 
hypothesis about entitlement would have to be modified or supplemented 
to allow for some entitlement to further ends that are not instrumental to 
the explicitly shared end. In this way, joint activity toward some common 
end may, through entitlement, lead to the sharing of additional further 
ends—namely, those that inform how participants conceive their initial and 
explicitly shared end is to be brought about.
Defeaters. We’ve been looking at whether and how instrumental con-
siderations affect entitlement. Let me turn now to the implication defeaters 
may have for entitlement. Here I will focus on an epistemic consideration 
that might be a candidate for undermining entitlement.19 Suppose you 
instruct me to turn left, but it’s not yet clear to me that your plan is to take 
High Street downtown. (Maybe you haven’t said why I should turn left, and 
maybe I’m not familiar enough with the neighborhood to glean that this is 
your plan.) So far, we have nothing we haven’t seen before, and the sugges-
tion has been that I’m entitled to this route-based consideration as a reason 
for which I’m turning left. But now suppose in addition that I know or have 
every reason to think that High Street is closed and that we can’t get down-
town this way; we can imagine that you are ignorant of this closure. How 
does this affect my entitlement to these route-based considerations?
If having reasons or the entitlement to reasons is like possessing epistemic 
justification, then we might be tempted to hold that my knowledge that 
High Street is blocked should defeat or undermine entitlement to the route-
based consideration for turning left. But it’s not clear that entitlement to 
reasons for action works quite like this. That’s because entitlement has been 
understood here as concerned with the reason for which one acts, and act-
ing for reasons seems to be quite different from possessing epistemic justifi-
cation. For example, I may know that there is no beer in the fridge, so I have 
no justification for thinking that I can get beer from the fridge. Nevertheless, 
momentarily forgetting that there is no beer in the fridge, I open the fridge 
in order to get a beer.20 In the individual case, then, possessing a defeater for a 
reason is compatible (at least on some occasions) with acting for this reason. 
Likewise, in the collective case, it seems possible for me to act for your reason, 
even though I possess defeaters for it. I possess a defeater for thinking that 
High Street gives us access to downtown. Thus, the reason for turning left is 
19 Non-epistemic considerations might similarly undermine entitlement. This is 
implicit in the earlier case of driving by the café to torment the ex.
20 I’m working here with the notion of a mental state defeater that is available to the 
agent upon reflection. The agent does possess the defeater understood in this way. Since 
the agent temporarily forgets, they do not possess a defeater understood as a conscious 
mental state defeater.
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undermined; it’s no longer a reason to turn left. Nevertheless, it appears that 
I may still be turning left for that reason, since I don’t yet realize that the 
point of turning left was to get on High Street. Possessing a defeater there-
fore doesn’t necessarily block entitlement.
But sometimes the possession of a defeater for a reason is such that it is 
hard to make sense of acting for that reason. In the beer example, I temporarily 
forget that the fridge is empty of beer, and in that case it is easy enough 
to imagine that I open the fridge in order to get a beer. But suppose that 
I don’t suffer anything like a memory lapse, undue distraction, or some 
other glitch—by which I mean a cause of error that doesn’t put in question 
my rational agency or the intelligibility of acting for that reason.21 Imagine 
instead a case that is non-glitchy, but more deeply weird: I remember that 
the fridge is empty—that is, I actively recall this fact—but then go on to 
open the fridge in order to get a beer. I don’t think that the action can be 
made sense of in this way. I might, of course, pretend to open the fridge to 
get a beer. Or I might open the fridge in order to get something else. Or, 
I might open the fridge in order to check to see whether my memory is 
playing tricks on me. But I can’t just open the fridge in order to get a beer. 
So, sometimes the presence of the defeater for a reason is such that we 
 cannot make sense of the agent being able to act on this reason. In light of 
this, I suggest that, absent glitches, possessing a defeater for reason R for 
one’s φ-ing would undermine one’s entitlement to R. That is, there is no 
entitlement to R in circumstances where one has a defeater for R, and φ-ing 
for R would compromise one’s rational agency.
Return to the case where I know or have good reason to believe that 
downtown is inaccessible via High Street. Whether I have an entitlement to 
the route-based considerations in this instance (i.e. whether I turn left in 
order to take High Street downtown) will depend on why the defeater 
I possessed did not alter the course of action. Was it due to some mere glitch 
in communication or memory? Or does it reflect a more serious compromising 
of my rationality or rational agency? Suppose I simply forget about the 
blockage on High Street. Or maybe I’m unlucky and so unfamiliar with the 
area that it doesn’t occur to me that you are directing us to High Street. Or 
maybe there is miscommunication and I am under the impression that you 
are having us take a different route. In all these cases my failure to bring to 
21 The idea is that suffering from this sort of error doesn’t put in question one’s ration-
ality. Of course, some serious memory deficits do compromise one’s rationality and can 
in some circumstances put in doubt the subject’s ability to act for a certain reasons. The 
idea of a glitch is related to Burge’s notion of brute error. But, as Burge (1988: 657) char-
acterizes it, “brute errors do not result from any sort of carelessness, malfunction, or 
irrationality” on the part of the subject. Although glitches are compatible with rationality, 
arguably they do involve some form of malfunction.
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bear the defeater should, I think, count as a glitch; it doesn’t reflect a deeper 
problem with my rational agency. It’s plausible, then, that in following your 
instruction to turn left, I am doing so in order to take High Street. So here 
we seem to have entitlement despite the presence of a defeater.
Suppose instead that there are no glitches. Although you don’t give the 
reason for turning left, there is no miscommunication that suggests that 
we’re not taking High Street. I remember that High Street is blocked. 
Moreover I am familiar with the neighborhood, and am not distracted from 
what we’re doing, and so it would not be hard for me to recognize that the 
plan is to take High Street. And yet, ignoring all the signs, I follow your 
instructions even though I know that High Street is blocked. This, I submit, 
puts in question the intelligibility of turning left in order to take High Street 
downtown. Here, the defeater does seem to undermine entitlement.22 I con-
clude that the possession of defeaters, suitably understood, offers another 
important constraint on the interpersonal entitlement to reasons.
CONCLUSION
We started with the thesis that sometimes the reasons that explain one’s 
action and account for its status as intentional are not one’s own (in the 
sense that one does not represent those reasons for oneself ). More  specifically, 
one’s entitlement to the reasons of another enables those reasons to figure as 
the reasons for which one acts. The claim will no doubt strike many as con-
troversial. For example, it challenges some conceptions of the agent’s non-
observational epistemic access to the reasons for which she acts. In these 
cases of entitlement, this access would likely instead have to be understood 
more along the lines of testimony and whatever sort of warrant for belief we 
acquire through testimony. There are also implications for discussion of 
responsibility. A condition for responsibility and blame for an action is its 
being attributable in some robust sense to the agent. On some views, this is 
22 Another case is where the navigator misleads me on purpose. I may have reasons 
for thinking that taking High Street should be ruled out or is much less desirable than 
some alternative route. If I realized that the plan was to take High Street, I would have 
insisted on some alternative. But you manage to trick or otherwise manipulate me so 
that I fail to glean what the plan is. I am tempted to think that what happens to me in 
this case is not the equivalent to a glitch but amounts, rather, to a deeper undermining 
of my rationality. It therefore would preclude entitlement. If one is not tempted to think 
that this form of trickery amounts to an undermining of rationality, then we might 
point instead to a further restriction on entitlement. We might say that absent glitches 
and deception, possessing a defeater for some reason R for one’s φ-ing would undermine 
one’s entitlement to R.
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understood in terms of agent’s ability to give some accounting for what he 
has done in terms of his evaluative judgments.23 But it appears that in cases 
of entitlement, action is attributable to the agent even though he would 
only be able fully to account for his φ-ing with help from someone else 
(such as the navigator in the example of the drive downtown). I have no 
doubt, then, that the central claim of the paper is provocative and work is 
needed on a number of issues to accommodate it. But it becomes easier to 
think that one individual can be entitled to the reasons of another once we 
recognize the scope and limits of entitlement, which I’ve only begun to 
sketch in the latter part of the paper. Properly understood, entitlement 
becomes a plausible and intriguing way to think of how individuals in 
 certain social contexts such as that of shared activity can be related to one 
another—namely, in terms of the reasons of one explaining the actions 
of another.24
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